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Abstract
This paper engages in the study of identity formation in Swedish foreign policy debate. The
study is situated within a broad constructivist field of research, drawing upon theoretical de-
bates on subjectivity and the performative making of the state. The study draws upon the no-
tion of ontological security and claims that sub-state actors, just as individuals, search for sta-
ble identities and a sense of continuity between self-esteem and action. Through the analysis
of policy declarations and parliamentary debates, this study outlines two contrasting narra-
tives of the state of Sweden represented by the two leading political coalitions. The analysis
shows how Sweden's state identity continues to move through a process of europeanization
while simultaneously experiencing a reawakening of an internationalist foreign policy brand.
Sweden's candidature to the United Nations Security Council is used as an example to illus-
trate this development and to demonstrate the link between biographical narratives and politi-
cal decision making.
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1. Introduction
1.1 New times in Swedish foreign policy
Upon taking office in October 2014, Sweden's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Margot Wall-
ström, described how she wished the world to perceive Sweden if it were a physical person.
I want it to be a brave person. A brave “hir”1. A brave hir who is clear, and has the
heart on the right place and who can cooperate with others. Who is diplomatic but at
the same time has a clear inner compass that guides our way. It is not a softy! Brav-
ery will be needed! And leadership.2
The message is resolute. The new government lead by the Social Democratic Party will take a
central role in international politics, leading the way by the promotion of firm moral princi-
ples. The tone is intriguing, considering Sweden's comparatively limited power resources as a
small state.3 This rhetoric is however not new in Swedish foreign policy but in fact highly
present during the 1960s and 1970s. By the end of the Cold War, when political tensions were
discharged and a new global political environment unfolded, Swedish foreign policy needed
no longer fear potential  threats coming from the Soviet Union. In post Cold War Europe,
Sweden's membership in the European Union did however provide another element to Swe-
den's integrity, as it came to entail closer foreign policy coordination with other EU member
states through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This shift, which is elaborat-
ed more thoroughly in the following section, is suggested to have caused a europeanization of
Swedish foreign policy identity.
1Wallström uses the Swedish word ”hen”, here translated to ”hir”. This is a commonly used gender
neutral pronoun.
2UD-Kuriren, 2014:3-4, p 8. Authors translation.
3As Annika Björkdahl (2013) notes, it is hard to define exactly the meaning of a small state, and 
the definition of a small state is not fixed. The author shares Björkdalhs understanding of 
”smallness” as refering to limitations in a state's relative or absolute power. 
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This paper investigates the making of Swedish foreign policy identity against the back-
drop of the parliamentary election in 2014. It aims to illustrate the instability in Swedish state
identity by pointing to conflicting narratives within the context of Swedish foreign policy de-
bate. This study joins the theoretical debate on identity and foreign policy by offering an ex-
ample of how to make sense of this connection. The following section offers a brief overview
of previous research on Swedish foreign policy and clarifies the empirical questions this paper
sets out to investigate. The subsequent section then outlines the theoretical point of departure
by clarifying the concepts of identity, subjectivity, and ontological security. The theoretical
section is followed by a study of the Swedish case in an effort to both illustrate theory and
give perspective on contemporary developments in Swedish foreign policy.
1.2 From neutrality to European integration
From the early stages of the cold war until the fall of the Soviet Union, Sweden has been de-
scribed as a strong voice in the international political debate. During this period Sweden had
an active foreign policy, which has been explained by both improved relations between the
global superpowers and increasingly radicalized social climate within Sweden's domestic con-
text. The so called “active foreign policy” contrasted to the earlier Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs Östen Undén's foreign policy doctrine which was comparatively careful and reluctant to
causing too much noise on the international stage.4 During the decades when Sweden had
turned to an active foreign policy, Sweden was recognized as a strong proponent for the Unit-
ed Nations, and even though the UN was strongly recognized as a key institution already in
the 1940s and 1950s, its significance for Sweden changed over time. In the 1950s it was per-
ceived as a collective security organization established to control the rising tensions between
the two power blocs. In the 1960s and 1970s, as a result of the decolonization processes, it be-
come more of a global forum, where Sweden could play an active role, often supporting the
position of third-world countries. In both the General Assembly and the Security Council,
Sweden started expressing support for non-aligned, ex-colonies, which was little appreciated
by the Western bloc which saw Sweden as an ideological partner.5 Bjereld  et al claim that
4Bjereld et al (2008), p 273.
5Bjereld et al (2008), p 255-257.
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Sweden's active foreign policy, including strong condemnations of the West and support for
the Global South, allowed Sweden to maintain the credibility as a neutral state despite its eco-
nomic and ideological proximity to the Western bloc. Sweden's antagonizing approach was
partly overlooked as Sweden mostly directed its attention to the issues in the Global South, as
this rhetoric had less effect on the power balance between the superpowers. In the same fash-
ion, Sweden could simultaneously exhibit its commitment to Western ideology by engaging
in global issues on justice, in spite of its military non-alignment.6 Toward the last stages of the
Cold War, the active foreign policy had become a core feature of Sweden's international pro-
file. Bjereld et al contend that Sweden was able to preserve its independent position by equal-
ly condemning the actions of the US and the Soviet Union, for example by criticizing their in-
vasions of Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively.7
Hans Lödén emphasizes the factor of identity and ideology in his attempt to explain the
expansion of the active foreign policy, trying to mitigate the theoretical dichotomy between
realism and a more liberal view on international relations.8 Lödén claims that between 1950
and 1970, the Social Democratic Party started developing an internationalist ideological vi-
sion, which viewed security as achievable through positive change of international institu-
tions. This vision included the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation, international
law and solidarity, rights of small states, and a steadfast support of international organizations
such as the UN.9
Despite somewhat different emphasis, Lödén and Bjereld et al clearly agree that Swe-
den had to mitigate between its Western and its neutral identity due to the political tensions
during the Cold War. Bjereld et al  conclude that this conflictual dimension however lost its
relevance by the end of the Cold War, as Sweden lost its primary threat to national security. 10
In this connection, one may ask what happened to Swedish foreign policy identity, given this
important structural shift. How would the post Cold War political landscape affect Sweden's
international profile?
Indeed, as has been observed, Sweden did change its course in foreign policy signifi-
cantly after the fall of the Soviet Union.11 In the late 1980s Sweden had already taken impor-
tant steps toward closer economic integration with the European Union by the signing of the
6Bjereld et al (2008), p 273-275.
7Bjereld et al (2008), p 300.
8Lödén (2005).
9Lödén, (2005), p 373.
10Bjereld et al (2008), p 332.
11af Malmborg (2001), Agius (2006); Bjereld et al (2008).
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European Economic Area Treaty and the way toward a more comprehensive European inte-
gration was wide open. The EU-membership had a crucial impact on Sweden's foreign policy
as the CFSP compelled Sweden to coordinate its position with other EU member states. In the
mid 1990s, the active foreign policy had been deeply undermined. From this point, it was no
longer possible to clearly distinguish Sweden's position from other EU member states', and
Sweden's support for the global south was dropped in favor of a more europeanized foreign
policy.12 Mikael af Malmborg argues that:
[i]f Sweden faces a threat after the Cold War it is not one of invasion but of marginalisation. Small
states are under strong pressure to approach the sole remaining power-bloc, or the two interrelated
blocs of NATO and the EU. Given the kindred nature of the partners in the EU and NATO such a
rapprochement comes more naturally today than during the Cold War, although it amounts to an
identity crisis for some individuals to abandon the role of 'world conscience' for a more anony-
mous place in the crowd of states in the Western security community.13
During the social democratic leadership of Prime Minister Göran Persson and Minister for
Foreign Affairs Anna Lindh, the enthusiasm for regional security,  EU and NATO become
more  central,  and  Sweden  turned  further  away  from past  internationalism,  closer  to  the
rhetoric of the Moderate Party, at the time lead by Carl Bildt.14 With a new global political
landscape, the Social Democratic Party appeared to have left behind, or at least modified, its
ambition to make Sweden an individual and active voice in global politics. In a wider per-
spective,  Swedish social  democracy was not alone in this ideological recession. As Bryan
Evans notes, the social democratic turn to global capitalism also took place in others countries
such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Australia and the United States.15
In The Social Construction of Swedish neutrality (2006), Christine Agius adopts a con-
structivist approach in her research on Swedish foreign policy from the Cold War until the
turn of the millennium. Agius explains the shift from social democratic internationalism to eu-
ropeanization under Bildt as a process of identity formation and a redefinition of Sweden's in-
ternational role. Despite the ostensible consensus between the two largest parties on Sweden's
foreign policy, the opinions on the rationales for Swedish internationalism were significantly
different. For social democrats, Swedish internationalism was essential for the definition of
Sweden itself and Swedish social democratic identity, while conservatives viewed such inter-
12Bjereld et al (2008), p 322.-329.
13af Malmborg (2001), p 181.
14af Malmborg (2001), p 181-182.
15Evans & Schmidt (2012) (ed.), p 2.
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nationalism as a way to continuously avoid pressing domestic issues.16 In order to change the
course of Swedish foreign policy, Bildt had to redefine the narrative of Sweden's role in the
world, an endeavor deemed hard due to the hegemonic role of the Social Democratic Party.
Agius relates to Finnemore and Sikknik's concept of “cognitive frames” to make sense of
Bildt's struggle to promote a more positive attitude toward European integration. According to
this view, norms are first created and then entrenched, and when new norms enter into such an
established framework, contention will arise between old and new norms. Bildt's political am-
bitions therefore had to fit within the social democratic understanding of Self and other.17 In
spite  of  Bildt's  journey  uphill,  Sweden  still  experienced  the  initial  phase  on  an  identity
makeover during the Moderate Party's three years in power. The party had to redefine Swe-
den's national identity as defined under decades of social democratic rule, resulting in an iden-
tity crisis as Sweden pulled closer to neo-liberal norms of the EU, partially abandoning a tra-
ditional view of social democratic welfare exceptionalism. By the Social Democratic Party's
return to power in 1994, Sweden was already approaching full scale membership in the EU,
but as Agius notes, the definition of Sweden's national identity remained heavily contested.18
The social democrats did however begin to bridge the previous ideological gap between social
democrats and the EU, and Persson's government expressed optimism for Sweden's possibili-
ties to have an actual progressive effect on the EU. The EU was previously viewed as a purely
capitalist project, but as the process of integration moved on, the union started to be seen as
an undertaking for peace and security.19 Agius however voices a concern that Sweden's in-
creased integration with the EU may lead to a loss in constructivity within the international
political dialogue, due to the loss in an independent voice.
Indeed, this seemed to be the assessment about Swedish neutrality for those (this author included)
who had hoped that Sweden's unique stance in international affairs would continue, despite the
pressures to abandon neutrality. However, in the 'war on terror' and deeper connection to the EU
through globalisation, Sweden may have an opportunity to convert the values and norms of neu-
trality toward a more normative appreciation of global politics and action […] The crucial ques-
tion is whether Sweden can bring its more critical edge and unique world vision to the European
table, so to speak, and work to transform the EU into a normative or cosmopolitan world power.20
16Agius (2006), p 157.
17Agius (2006), p 159-160; see Finnemore and Sikknik (1998).
18Agius (2006), p 161-184.
19Agius (2006), p 171.
20Agius (2006), p  201. Italics in original.
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This study departs from a shared concern for the future of Sweden's “critical edge and unique
world vision”. The question Agius poses appears even more relevant considering the histori-
cal shift in Swedish politics with two recently concluded terms with a government coalition
with Bildt serving as Minister for Foreign Affairs. What could be expected from Sweden's
foreign policy with the return of the Social Democratic Party?
Perhaps one could expect some level of continuance of the active foreign policy, despite
some depressing accounts of a “silence”21 in Swedish foreign policy. Annika Björkdahl claims
that small states, Sweden included, indeed proceed to actively have an impact on global is-
sues, despite their shortage of power resources in both relative and absolute terms.22 Björkdahl
argues that Sweden still “punches above its weight” in international politics by continuing to
provide steadfast support for international institutions and norms. Despite the gradual shift in
Swedish foreign policy identity, Sweden has been able to sustain its influence in international
affairs by acting as a “norm entrepreneur” within both the UN and the EU, although the norm
entrepreneurship has been more successful within the latter due to the sharing of core values.
On the other hand, the lack of a coherent normative framework outside of Europe explains the
failure of Sweden's normative entrepreneurship in the UN.23 Christopher Browning employs
the similar notion of “branding” to describe how Sweden along with other Nordic countries
have been marketing a “Nordic brand”. Browning holds that Nordic countries not only have
perceived their statecraft as exceptional but also externally marketable across the world. Ele-
ments such as peacefulness, bridge-building, international solidarity, and the economic sys-
tem were central to this brand. However, by the end of the Cold War, the Nordic brand was
gradually abandoned through the europeanization process.24 Douglas Brommesson, who has
studied the normative europeanization of Swedish foreign policy, also identifies such an ex-
ceptionalism and links it to what he describes as an internationalist foreign policy. The fol-
lowing table, adopted from Brommesson, illustrates a classification of two ideal types of for-
eign policy, and will be used as reference for the following study.
21Östberg (2012), ”Swedish social democracy after the Cold War”. In: Evans & Schmidt (ed.) 
Social democracy after the Cold War, p 228.
22Björkdahl (2013).
23Björkdahl (2013), p 334. 
24Browning  (2007).
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Table 1: Brommesson's ideal types of foreign policy
Internationalist foreign 
policy 
Normatively europeanized 
foreign policy
World-view A common humanity with a 
common destiny that may be 
reached together
Different cultural spheres 
with a Europe based on 
certain values and a specific 
territory
Principled beliefs International cooperation 
characterized by 
progressivism and equality 
between states and 
individuals
Loyalty and solidarity to 
values identified as European 
heritage, but still values of 
universal validity
Causal beliefs A strong international order 
as safeguard of equal rights 
for all
A strong Europe has the 
power to universally enforce 
the values identified as 
'European' 
Source: Brommesson (2010), p 232.
Brommesson concludes that Sweden's foreign policy became normatively europeanized dur-
ing the 1990s, resulting in a stronger emphasis on European unity both spatially and ideation-
ally.25 The ideal types provide a useful point of reference in the analysis of Swedish foreign
policy and will be discussed further in relation to the empirical study.
This section has briefly outlined the gradual development of Sweden's foreign policy
identity. It has underlined that Sweden's identity has been imbued with a certain exceptional-
ism over the years. Some scholars have explained this exceptionalism by pointing to power
balance policies during the Cold War, while others have emphasized ideology as the underly-
ing factor. There is however reasons to argue, without making too sweeping conclusions, that
one answer not necessarily excludes the other. Finding one single explanation is however not
very meaningful nor the purpose of this paper. What should be stressed is instead the gradual
shift from an internationalist to a normative europeanized foreign policy and a discursive al-
teration of the active foreign policy.
25 Brommesson (2010), p 237-238.
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1.3 Purpose and research question
Against the background of the above conclusions, this study sets off to investigate the identity
formation process in Swedish foreign political debate and its connection to political action.
The purpose of this study is captured by the following research question: How do discourses
on state identity influence the course of Swedish foreign policy? The research question em-
bodies both an empirical concern for the developments in Swedish foreign policy and a theo-
retical discussion regarding the connection between identity and political action. As will be
argued throughout this paper, discourses shape identities, and identities influence the ratio-
nales for political action. The following part sets out to disentangle the central theoretical top-
ics and outlines the methodological approach for this study.
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2. Identities, narratives and action
This part defines the theoretical context in which this paper is situated. By drawing upon a
broad constructivist  approach to  international  relations,  this  part  explores  three theoretical
topics  central  for the purposes of  this  paper.  The first  topic  pertains  to  the constructivist
approach to identity and international relations. The second topic concerns subjectivity and
the ontological status of the state. The third topic brings in the concept of ontological security
and  its link to agency. Before embarking on these specific inquiries, a short overview of the
constructivist approach to international relations will provide a broad theoretical context.
2.1 A constructivist approach
Within the field of international relations, realism and liberalism have commonly been viewed
as the two main theoretical approaches for the understanding of states' interests and behaviors.
However, since the fall of the Soviet Union and the shift away from bipolar power relations
constructivists have offered a considerably different view in this debate.26 While realists and
liberals may disagree on the relevance of global inter-connectivity and its influence on states'
behavior, both perspectives share rationalist assumptions about the foundations of the inter-
play between states. Building on the accommodation of economic theory in the discipline of
international relations, rationalist theories like realism and liberalism suggest that states act ra-
tionally to achieve its highest prioritized goal in any given situation. Influenced by Hobbesian
and Lockean understandings of rationality as an instrument to protect and achieve certain ma-
terial interests, realists and liberals go on and study international relations.27 Scholars using ra-
tional choice theory are, as Jeffrey Checkel explains, mostly concerned with utility maximiza-
tion based on predefined ideas about the “good” option, often related to power or wealth;
norms and social factors are seen as exogenous, and may at most have a curbing effect on the
26Wendt (1988); Keohane (1988); Ruggie (1998).
27Choi (2015), p 110-112; see Ruggie (1998), p  862.
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rational state.28 As Ji Young Choi points out, many rationalists do in fact concur with the ar-
gument that ideas and norms do have a significant impact on states' behavior, but their ratio-
nalist view remains underdeveloped, and at best they view norms and identities as constraints,
resulting in a too static view on the state's identity.29 In Alexander Wendt's famous article
from 1988, he claims that social theories based on rational choice directs our attention away
from certain questions about identity, by presuming that identity is exogenous to actors' deci-
sion making. “Questions about identity- and interest-formation are therefore not important to
students of international relations. A rationalist problématique, which reduces process to dy-
namics of behavioral interaction among exogenously constituted actors, defines the scope of
systemic theory”.30
The central constructivist argument is that actors – that is to say their identities and in-
terests – and structures are mutually constituted. Ted Hopf argues that structure, in world poli-
tics understood as “a set of relatively unchangeable constraints on the behavior of states”31, is
deprived of meaning without any intersubjective understanding of norms and practices. Ac-
tors would simply not be able to act without any preconception of norms. Hopf offers a hypo-
thetical example with an accidental fire in a theater, where all the visitors run against the one
single door leading out. If the only material circumstance would be the existence of this one
single door to freedom, how could we then know who would exit first? Would it be the chil-
dren, the disabled or perhaps women? Even in a case like this, Hopf says, we need to know
about norms, cultures and institutions to help explain the structure surrounding the actors.32
The assumption that structure is both materially and socially constructed, and that actors gain
their understanding of their interests within this historically specific structure, contrasts to ra-
tionalists' approach to international relations. Checkel states that:
Constructivists emphasize a process of interaction between agents and structures; the ontology is
one of mutual constitution, where neither unit of analysis – agents or structures – is reduced to the
other and made “ontologically primitive.” This opens up what for most theorists is the black box
of interests and identity formation; state interests emerge from and are endogenous to interaction
with structures.33
28Checkel (1998), p 327.
29Choi (2015), p 114.
30Wendt (1988), p 392.
31Hopf (1998), p 172; see Waltz (1979).
32Hopf (1998), p 173.
33Checkel (1998), p 326.
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According to Hopf, a world without identities would be chaotic, since identities are a prereq-
uisite for order and predictability. They are important because they serve three crucial purpos-
es in society; 1) telling you who you are, 2) telling others who you are, and 3) telling you who
others are. By defining who you are, identities enable the defining of interests or preferences
in actors' decision making, given a specific context.34 Simply put, an actor needs to know who
it is before knowing what to do. The rationalist premise that identities, norms and interests are
exogenously given, does little to provide understanding of the formation of interests. By tak-
ing for granted the view that states act rationally according to self-interest, one assumes a dis-
association between interests and identity and therefore leaves little attention to the under-
standing of the mutual  constitution between structures and actors.  However,  the objection
against rationalist ontology does not mean that constructivists reject utility-maximization as a
possible behavior, simply that constructivists challenge the static view on identity as exoge-
nously constructed.
In the ontological critique of rationalism, constructivists stand united. Ontological as-
sumptions  do nevertheless  give rise to  issues of epistemological  significance,  and on this
point different constructivists maintain somewhat diverging views relating to the role of insti-
tutions, rules, norms, and discursive practices.35 John Ruggie argues that constructivists have
not yet been able to present a complete theory on international relations, and therefore one
should see constructivism as “a philosophically and theoretically informed perspective on and
approach to the empirical study of international relations”.36 Hopf makes a binary division be-
tween constructivist scholars, employing the notions conventional constructivism, in which
one finds scholars such as Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, and critical construc-
tivism,  which has been represented by David Campbell  and Jutta  Weldes among others.37
Hopf argues that despite their agreements on the intersubjective creation of meaning, contex-
tualization, and the mutual constitution of structure and agency, conventional and critical con-
structivists lack a common understanding on the concept of identity.38 Constructivists may
agree on the basic assumption that identity and structure are mutually constituted, but a coher-
ent understanding on the process of identity formation still remains absent. In addition, meta-
theoretical questions about epistemology continue to be unsettled between the two construc-
tivist camps. While conventional constructivists set out explore the reproduction of identities
34Hopf (1998), p 175.
35Frueh (2003), p 20. See Klotz and Lynch (2007).
36Ruggie (1998), p 856, sic. See also Griffiths (2011) p 156-158.
37Hopf (1998), see Katzenstein (1998), Campbell (1999) and Weldes (1999).
38Hopf (1998), p 181-183.
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and to explain how those cause certain actions, critical constructivists invest their attention in
scrutinizing the naturalization of certain truths. In contrast to conventional scholars such as
Wendt and Katzenstein, critical constructivists do not approach identity as if it were a variable
or a potential “cause” for action, but as a process in which myths are given specific mean-
ings.39 Consequently,  conventional constructivists attempt to maintain their epistemological
positivism while simultaneously arguing for a constructivist ontological view in which actors
and structures are mutually constituted. Critical constructivists, however, reject such an epis-
temology viewing it as impossible to combine with a constructivist ontological position. If ac-
tors and social phenomena by definition are non-constant, how could we suggest that social
phenomenon A causes phenomenon B without prematurely closing the meaning of A? Doing
so, critical theorists argue, would be to challenge basic constructivist assumptions about the
fluidity of meaning.
The constructivist disagreements on meta-theoretic questions has, and will likely contin-
ue to in the future. The aim for this paper is nevertheless not to engage with constructivists in
a debate on meta-theory, but to explore how certain theoretical discussions within the field
may provide useful tools to understand the empirical questions of this paper. One such discus-
sion relates, as mentioned above, to the concept of identity. Before this first part sets out to
concretize the potential of identity formation and discussing the relation between of ontologi-
cal security and agency, some clarifications should be made regarding the central matter of
analysis in this paper, namely the state itself.
2.2 Subjectivity and identity of the state
To make sense of the process of identity formation, it is imperative to first clarify how to
approach the state itself as a subject. One should ask why it makes sense to use the state as a
starting  point  for  analysis  in  the  first  place.  Indeed,  it  seems  problematic  to  treat  states
similarly  to  how  we  treat  individuals  as  states  obviously  consist  of  multiple  physical
individuals, each one possessing its own subjectivity. To suggest that states themselves have
identities is to presuppose that they are subjects to begin with, and while it  is possible to
question such a  proposition,  this  paper  at  least  acknowledges  the analytical  usefulness of
39Hopf (1998), p 181-183. See also Wendt (1999)
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viewing the state as subject, even in the narrowest sense. Some clarifying distinctions could
however explain this position and underline inherent difficulties.
Conventional constructivism
From a Wendtian perspective, states are considered to be ”constituted by the self-organizing,
homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities”40. The foundation for the state's so
called corporate identity is primarily its people and its physical land. This corporate identity
assumes the existence of an actor with an awareness and a memory of the Self. In Wendt's
words, corporate identity ”refers to the intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that constitute actor
individuality. […] for organizations it means their constituent individuals, physical resources,
and the shared beliefs and institutions in virtue of which individuals function as 'we'”.41 In his
article “The state as person in international theory”, Wendt elaborates these reflections more
in detail.42 Wendt's discussion stems from two common assumptions, which hold that: 1) the
state  is  a  fictive  result  of  the  mind,  and 2)  the  state's  personality  can  indeed  help  us  to
understand the world. The problem assumes a physicalist understanding of the world, which
contends that reality is exclusively constituted by matter, that is to say material objects, and
that matter is ontologically prior to mind. Wendt asks why the state, a mere construction of
our  (material)  brains,  has  been  such a  useful  concept  in  making  sense  of  the  world.  To
respond to this question, Wendt first clarifies that he approaches the state as a psychological
person, not a legal or a moral one, which means that he focuses on the mental and cognitive
traits of the subjectivity. Moreover, out of the three criteria for psychological personhood –
being an intentional actor, being an organism, and being conscious – states can only meet the
first. Wendt explores the possibility of stretching state subjectivity to also meet the second
criterion for personhood, concluding that  the state  despite  important  dissimilarities  indeed
shares  some  core  elements  with  the  organism.  Wendt  lists  substantial  individuality,
organization, homeostasis, and autonomy as the state's central commonalities with organisms,
while pointing out the existence of multiple independent individuals within the state and the
absence of non-genetical reproduction mechanisms as reasons for ultimately not equating the
state with an organism. To meet this challenge, Wendt argues that the state may be seen as a
40Wendt (1999), p 224. In the case of individuals, this identity is called ”personal identity”.
41Wendt (1994), p 385.
42For an extensive presentation of his argument see Wendt (2004).
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“superorganism”,  defined  as  “a  collection  of  single  creatures  that  together  possess  the
functional organization implicit  in the formal definition of organism”.43 By employing the
concept of superorganism Wendt bypasses the limitations of the analogy with an organism,
allowing him to go further in his endeavor of personifying the state. 
What makes superorganisms individuals, in the sense of having a spatiotemporal identity, and thus
potentially being persons?  In  the case of  organisms the answer  is  physical,  the skin.  But  this
criterion won't work for superorganisms, since they are composed of physically separate beings
[…] The idea here is that it is the participation of individuals in a collective thought process (in
this case, in a 'narrative of state'), whose boundaries are instantiated by the practices that produce
and reproduce that process, which enables the superorganisms to survive.44
The Wendtian, or conventional, way of defining the state's agency is an attempt to give the
state an real subjectivity without ascribing it any essential meaning. States are not, as realists
claim, power-seeking and egoistic by nature, but are still given an essence by the subjectivity
attached to them. States are thereby holders of essence,  although a weak one. Wendt still
contends  that  the  state  exists  only  as  long  as  people,  not  least  IR  scholars,  continue  to
reproduce  their  existence  by  treating  them  as  if  they  were  real;  “Given  IR's  claim  to
authoritative knowledge about world politics, the continual performance of this narrative in
IR theory contributes importantly to making this 'fantasy' a reality”.45
Critical constructivism
Wendt's  argument  pictures  one  possible  way  of  grappling  with  the  issue  of  the  state's
subjectivity which allows for continued focus on the state as a given corporate entity.  The
argument  is  however not fully satisfying due to  the apparent  essentialist  assumptions.  To
conclude that the state possesses subjectivity by pointing to the criterion of intentionality is, at
the very least, a small, yet substantial, leap of faith. Steve Smith highlights this problematic
issue in Wendt's account on international politics, arguing that Wendt ignores the discussion
on how actors receive their subjectivity in the first place by assuming the stability of the state
as a social construction. In Wendt's view, where state subjectivity is pre-social, language is
43Sloan Wilson and Sober (1989) quoted in Wendt (2004), p 309.
44Wendt (2004), p 311.
45Wendt (2004), p 316.
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perceived as an instrument for state agency rather a constituent part of it.46 David Campbell is
equally skeptical to Wendt's view on state subjectivity, arguing that Wendt makes a “powerful
rationalist pull” by defending the anthropomorphic view on the state.47 While the Wendtian
view on state subjectivity rests on the ontological presumption that states, at least in a narrow
sense, exists prior to interaction with the international system, critical constructivists hold a
significantly  more  skeptical  opinion  on  the  matter  of  state  subjectivity.  Critical  scholars
instead contend that the state lacks ontological basis outside the exclusionary practices of
discourse,  and as  such cannot  exist  prior  to  action.  The objection  against  pre-social  state
subjectivity does not mean that critical constructivists also reject the idea of state identity,
only that any identity of the state is unstable and constantly under reproduction.48 By drawing
upon Judith Butler's notion of performative constitution, Campbell makes an analogy between
gender and the state identity,  claiming that just  as the body receives its gendered identity
through social codes, the state receives its identity through “a stylized repetition of act”.49
Luiza Bialasiewicz  et al explain that discourses are performative,  meaning that discourses
constitute the subjects of which they speak, whether it is an individual or a state. The state
therefore  comes  to  existence  by  discursive  practices  such  as  debates,  political  speeches,
economic investments  and immigration policies.  Discourse is  both ideal  and material  and
”refers  to  a  specific  series  of  representations  and  practices  through  which  meanings  are
produced,  identities  constituted,  social  relations  established,  and  political  and  ethical
outcomes made more or less possible”.50 In a similar vein, Erik Ringmar argues that the state
acquires its ontological status from narratives about the state. Due to the difficulty of defining
a phenomenon for what it is “in itself”, one should talk about phenomena, such as the state, as
something which exists under a certain description, that is to say a certain narrative. Meaning
is not given by fixed definitions, but through resemblances between one thing and another:
“Metaphor is rock-bottom. To ask for something more fundamental is to ask for too much, but
also to ask for more than we need”.51 This study draws upon this view on the ontological
status of the state and employs narratives as a central component for the upcoming analysis. It
will be successively knitted together with theory and the method throughout the argument.
46Smith (2000), 160.
47Campbell (1999), p 220. Anthropomorphism means the attribution of human characterstic to non 
human forms.
48Cho (2012), p 309.
49Campbell (1999), p 9-10. Italics from Campbells quotation of Butler, see Butler (1990).
50Bialasiewicz et al (2007), p 406.
51Ringmar (1996), p 450-451.
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Summarizing a position
It has here been argued that conventional and critical constructivists depart from somewhat
different ontological positions,  displayed by their disagreement on state subjectivity.  Their
distinct starting points also explain their separate focus of study; conventional scholars focus
mostly on the international system and the interaction between states with given corporate
identities, while critical scholars are more concerned with the internal process of subjectivity
production. By using the notion “performativity” instead of “construction”, critical scholars
stress the fluidity and the repetitive discursive production of the subject, turning the attention
of inquiry to the creation of the state's Self. Young Chul Cho points to the advantages of both
conventional and critical approaches, claiming that neither is superior to the other but that
they  are  concerned  with  rather  distinct  processes  of  identity  formation.  Cho  suggests  a
pragmatic approach to the study of identity:
Whether one adopts either constructivism depends not on selecting the correct way to comprehend
the nation-state, but rather on research purpose and question. […] The pragmatic approach is that,
without being immersed heavily in the meta-theoretical strife between the two seeming conflicting
constructivist camps, both constructivisms should be treated as different analytical frameworks for
capturing different (internal and/or external) faces of a state's identity [...]52
This  paper  acknowledges  this  distinction  between the  two constructivist  ontologies  while
leaning toward the critical research interest in the internal formation of subjectivity. This must
not be understood as a rejection of states' central role in international relations. To study the
internal  representation of state subjectivity is not to deny that states may act “as if” they
possessed a unitary subjectivity.  The focus on internal representations of state subjectivity
must  however  not  divert  the  analysis  away  from  relations  between  states.  “Internal
representations” refers to the multiple discursive performances internal to the state and not to
domestic politics. These internal representations, such as political speeches, can then go on
and perform state subjectivity by advancing a specific foreign policy, that is to say, promote a
certain  relation  to  another  state.  The point  of  accepting  this  “as  if”  notion of the state  –
slightly less ambitious than Wendt's idea of a superorganism –  is that most people accept the
cognitive existence of states and their influence on our thinking. The assumption is practical,
52Cho (2012), p 311.
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as it motivates the critical  inquiry of state-internal struggles over the performance of state
subjectivity without rejecting the state's impact on our daily lives. The empirical evidence is
simply  too  convincing  to  dispute  that  states  remain  the  principal  players  in  the  field  of
international peace and security.53 Wendt's attempt to ontologically ground state subjectivity
in the criterion of intentionality should be taken for what it is; a theoretical simplification to
make sense of the international system. One should also note that Wendt has little interest in
identity formation and foreign policy in his theorizing, but in the international system as a
whole.54 
The  debate  between  conventional  and  critical  constructivists  nevertheless  raises  a
crucial question related to the theoretical coherence of this study. As this paper examines the
contending views of Sweden's state subjectivity, it rejects the given subjectivity of the state
while  assuming the subjectivity  of  those groups assumed  to compete  for  stabilizing  state
subjectivity,  namely political parties. If one postulates that subjectivity is acquired through
performativity (“a stylized repetition of acts”), this point of departure seems to encapsulate
what  appear  to  be  an  ontological  contradiction.  One  may  rightly  ask:  if  subjectivity  is
constantly created through performative discourses, why should we take political parties and
alliances for granted as relevant subjects? If we assume that political parties have pre-social
subjectivities we assign them corporate identities in the same fashion we reject states those
very same. This critical argument could of course continue, as long as one presupposes the
preexistence of ontological  subjectivity,  not least  of subjectivities  attached to groups. The
question is then: where do we begin to study identity formation, and how far may we extend
such a theory without assigning stable subjectivities to corporate identities?
This  paper  acknowledges  the  position  held  by  Campbell  and other  critical  scholars
insofar as it shares the aim to explore the performative articulation of Sweden through the
study  of  foreign  policy.  To  facilitate  the  study  of  Sweden's  state-subjectivity  and  the
discursive  competitions  within,  some  theoretical  simplifications  must  be  made.  Political
parties and alliances are in this paper viewed as corporate identities. Therefore, this paper also
gently collides with a poststructural research interest. Simplifying political groups by viewing
them “as if” they were real, however allows for increased attention to the making of state
subjectivity,  which political  parties themselves intend to seize and perform. There will be
reason  to  return  to  this  question  in  the  following  section,  which  outlines  the  theoretical
linkages between security, identity, and action.
53Björkdahl (2002), p  47.
54Cho (2012), p 310, footnote 7. See Wendt (1999).
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2.3 Ontological security and nation branding
Ontological security
The concept of ontological security is related to the poststructural assumption that subjectivity
is created through actions. It underscores a mutual reinforcement between identity and action
by claiming that individuals conceive anxiety as a threat  to their  identity.  In the study of
performative  representations  of Swedish foreign policy,  this  concept  offers a theoretically
informed perspective on the formation of identity and the need for stable narratives about the
Self. The term ontological security was initially used by sociologists and scholars such as
Anthony Giddens55 but  has  become  more  widely  used  also  within  international  relations.
Ontological security refers to the individual's sense of security in the Self, which contrasts to a
traditional realist  view in which security is related to the body or the state. While realists
study security as a struggle for survival, constructivists employing the notion of ontological
security instead focus on the security of being and the survival of biographical narratives.56 In
this paper, which sets out to examine contending narratives of Sweden's state subjectivity, this
theoretical  concept  offers  a  way to  interpret  the  meaning  of  action  and  its  performative
connection to the securitization of subjectivity.
As  realists  and  constructivists  adopt  different  views  on  what  to  securitize,  their
understandings of the sources of insecurity appear as slightly different. In contrast to realists'
focus on states' fear of physical threat, the concept of ontological security instead captures
anxiety as the source of insecurity. This theory claims that individuals possess a latent fear –
an existential anxiety – regarding their identity, which is directly linked to their ability to act.
Simply put, identity and agency are closely intertwined.57 Maintaining ontological security
furthermore means to assure a certain level of stability and coherence in one's perception of
the Self. When ontological security is threatened, individuals engage in a search for one stable
identity as a way to securitize their subjectivity. To nourish a cohesive picture of the Self the
agent  needs  to  act;  ontological  security  is  gained  through  practice,  but  to  enable  action
individuals simultaneously need to securitize their subjectivity,  that is to say defining who
they are.58 What the concept of ontological security illustrates is, hence, a mutually constituted
55See Giddens (1991).
56Steele (2005), p 527.
57Mitzen (2006), p 345.
58Kinnvall (2004) p 749; Mitzen (2006), p 344.
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relation between identity and action in which each one sustains the other. This relates back to
previous discussion which concluded that an actor needs to know who it is before it knows
what to do. To this idea we can now add that an actor also need to do in order to sustain the
idea of who it is.
The claim that individuals seek to secure a firm sense of continuity in their conception
of  the  world  suggests  that  narratives  are  essential  for  enabling  action.  Needless  to  say,
narratives are constantly in the process of making through routinized behavior, which means
that they can change and clash with contrasting narratives. A narrative may also be challenged
by critical situations which force the individual to cope with the potential conflicts between its
own narrative and its actual behavior. Brent Steele explains this situation by referring to the
notion of shame:
Shame  occurs  when  actors  feel  anxiety  about  the  ability  of  their  narrative  to  reflect  their
behaviour; put another way, they feel shame when there exists too much distance between this
biographical narrative and the actions they seek to fulfil a sense of self-identity. […] It is unnatural
for a state to identify itself one way and to 'perform' acts in a different way. 59
The notion of shame illustrates the mutual constitution between identity and actions. Negative
outcomes of a security challenge are traditionally understood as physical harm, but from this
perspective  negative  outcomes  are  instead  defined  as  shame.  The  degree  of  cognitive
dissonance is directly associated with this feeling of shame,  just as realists  view material
resources and damages as measures of negative outcomes. The following table, adopted from
Steele, displays the theoretical concept of ontological security.
Table 2: Traditional vs. Ontological security
Traditional security Ontological security
(1) Security as: Survival Being
(2) Agent structured by: Distribution of power Routines and self-identity
(3) Source of insecurity: Fear of threat Anxiety
(4) Outcome of incorrect 
response to challenge:
Physical harm Shame
(5) Measurement of outcome: Change in material 
capabilities
Difference between 
biographical narrative and 
59Steele (2005), p 527.
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actual behavior; discursive 
remorse.
(6) Structural change: Change in distribution of 
power
Routinized critical situations, 
change in self-identity, 
change in agent's routine
Source: Steele (2005), p 527.
By  analyzing  discursive  representations  of  the  state  of  Sweden,  this  paper  illustrates  a
securitization of Sweden as an “as if” subject. Sub-state actors like political fractions possess
and perform distinct biographical narratives for the state by giving descriptions of who it is.
Biographical narratives are not innately different from other narratives, but simply concern
the descriptions of the Self rather than something else. This is the narrative which provides
the  subject  with  a  definition  of  who it  is  and an  idea  of  what  to  do,  referred  to  before.
Narratives are therefore not simply instruments used to interpret  the world, but normative
accounts about what the world is and what it should be. They play a key role for states in
maintaining  their  ontological  security  by  providing  “autobiographical  justification  and
continuity with the 'good past'”.  Consequently,  biographical  narratives  are both inherently
political and inseparable from the state itself.60 This postulation also suggests, in accordance
with the concept of performativity, that narratives are confined within – or at least in close
proximity to – action, as any action must be followed by an explanation for that particular act.
Whether or not an actor needs to explain its action for, say the mass media, it needs to explain
the action for itself.  It  must  know why it  is  doing what it  is  doing to  become itself  and
maintain its ontological security.
It  should  be  noted  that  this  paper  makes  no  uncompromising  distinction  between
political parties and the state, without for that matter suggesting that they comprise a unitary
subject. Political parties do not constitute the state but they all do, at least in the context of
this study, aspire to seize the representative power of the state. Despite the fact that parties
can promote diverging narratives of the state, they are nevertheless engaged in the making of
the state;  political  alliances  are  not  equal  to  the  state  but  institutionally  integrated  in  the
process of its making. Suggesting an interwoven relation between political  groups and the
state also means that the state, despite its non-given “as if” subjectivity, certainly do matter
for political  actors battling for defining its identity.  One could of course question whether
political party A is able to experience shame if the behavior of political party B challenges A's
60Subotić (2015), p 5.
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biographical narrative of Sweden. This paper, however, does not support such an extreme
separation between political parties. It it more productive to assume that the state, despite its
questioned  subjectivity,  serves  as  ideational  glue  which  connects  political  groups  despite
ideological differences. The “as if” approach allows for a study of the internal performing of
the state without rejecting the state's mental impact on actors claiming to act in its name.
This  way  of  employing  the  concept  of  ontological  security  enables  the  study  of
narratives performed by groups within the state. Studying groups by using a concept designed
for individuals is however somewhat problematic. The question is therefore; is it possible to
apply the notion of ontological security to political parties and alliances just as theory does to
individuals? And if possible, why not continue and apply it to the state as a whole? If political
parties can be given anthropomorphic attributes such as ontological security, why not attach
similar traits to the state? This is a valid question, and should be addressed at least briefly.
First  of  all,  one  should  keep  in  mind  that  this  study  aims  to  illustrate  narratives  as
performative  activities  within the state  of Sweden.  Engaging in reductionist  arguments  in
which nothing is more than the sum of its parts would certainly offer little support in this
endeavor. Although it is certainly possible – as Mitzen and Wendt have argued elsewhere61 –
to  assign  ontological  security  to  the  state,  this  paper  goes  half  way  and  emphasizes  the
impossibility of fully separate political parties from the state. However, as Mitzen accurately
points out; any ontological assumption, such as the anthropomorphic attribution to groups, is
only as useful as the knowledge it produces.62 The advantage of starting from the level of sub-
state actors is that it enables the illustration of multiple discursive performances of the state.
In combination with a soft understanding of the state's subjectivity this approach supports a
critical take on the state's subjectivity, while recognizing that the state nevertheless remains a
fundamental idea that is not fully distinguishable from groups within.
Nation branding
To create a slightly more tangible link between the concept of ontological security and the
Swedish  case,  this  study  draws  upon  Christopher  Browning's  notion  of  nation  branding.
Browning argues that national dignity and self-esteem in the past mostly were affected by
successes and failures on the battlefield, which were then upheld by narratives pronouncing
61See Mitzen (2006) and Wendt (1994).
62Mitzen (2006), p 353.
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the state's successes in terms of geopolitical gains earned through violence. Browning argues
that in an increasingly globalized world where pre-Westphalian norms of geopolitical anarchy
at least institutionally have been mitigated, ontological security and a sense of self-esteem
have become more  important.  63 The  need for  national  identity  narratives  did not  simply
vanish with the decline of past  norms of military conquests.  The shift  from one norm to
another  did  not  eliminate  the  need  for  national  identity,  and  suggesting  this  would  also
contradict the claim that ontological security is intrinsic to human psychology.
The shift to Westphalian norms however changed the practical means of upholding state
identity, and one such mechanism is nation branding. Browning describes national brands as
similar, yet not equal to identity on the following points; 1) brands are more directly related to
strategic action and the forming of emotional  ties to the nation itself,  2) brands are more
stable,  less  nuanced,  representing  a  temporally  closed  definition  of  state  identity,  and  3)
brands are not requisites for the performing of subjectivity.64 Brands may seem superficial at
first sight, but their role in the creation of national self-esteem is not irrelevant, certainly not
in global communities in which marketing power yields  stronger acceptance than military
force. By using the notion of branding, Browning introduces “market-based rationalities” into
the process of identity formation, arguing that “[w]hat really counts, though, is the recognition
of one's wealth by one's peers. […] Accordingly,  national self-esteem becomes dependent
upon having an attractive brand given the desires for conspicuous consumption in the global
marketplace”.65
The idea of nation branding corresponds to the previous discussion on Sweden's  so
called foreign policy exceptionalism (see section 1.2). Browning argues that Sweden and the
Nordic states have shared a consciousness of the notion of a Nordic model, encompassing
certain “Nordic” approaches to economic and foreign policy. This model, which has been key
for the Nordic countries' national identity construction, has also been marketed as a brand for
an international public, displaying an ideal state. This model started to decline after the fall of
the Soviet Union as elements of this Nordic model become more and more accepted within an
emerging  idea  of  a  European  model.66 With  this  in  mind,  one  may  reasonably  ask  what
happened to this brand. Is it still present or has it merged fully with some sort of “European
brand”?
63Browning (2013), p 6.
64Browning (2013), p 7.
65Browning (2013), p 10.
66Browning (2007), p 44-45.
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Browning's notion of branding shifts the focus from outside security threats to the state's
attention-seeking behavior toward like-minded and competing states.67 The branding notion
provides a useful analytical entry for this study by tying together ontological security with
foreign policy.  Adopting the concept of branding must however not force the exclusion of
threat definitions as a part of identity formation. Conversely, brands themselves could in fact
be constituted by articulations of “othering”. There are no reasons to claim that the forming of
“emotional ties” and “closed definitions of the state identity” would exclude articulations of
outside  threats.  An  attractive  brand  promoted  in  the  so  called  global  marketplace  could
possibly even benefit  from threat  definitions,  as  long as  these  articulations  yield  positive
attention from a state's peers. It also makes sense to ask whether it is possible to identify
multiple state brands working in parallel, but since brands represent strategic and temporal
closures of state identity,  this seems unrealistic. This does not mean that brands cannot be
challenged,  only  that  competing  nation-state  brands  are  unlikely  to  be  promoted
simultaneously. Identity conflicts will still be apparent within the state, and the branding of
the state may remain disputed by internal disagreements on the identity of the state. Brands
should  therefore  be  understood  as  stable,  politico-strategic  representations  of  a  certain
dominating identity. A brand is however not necessarily inherent to a biographical narrative,
but may be deeply connected to it as the Nordic case has shown. Whether such a brand can be
identified or not is an empirical question.
2.4 Methods and material
Studying narratives
This study analyzes state identity formation within the foreign policy debates between the So-
cial Democratic Party and the center-right coalition, the Alliance. To study identities is to en-
gage in the study of discursive performances, and narratives are perhaps the most apparent
form of discursive performance. Capturing a narrative is however somewhat difficult due to
the constant struggle between different discursive representations, which all reach for hege-
mony by stabilizing the meaning.68 In this study, the Swedish state is treated as an unstable re-
67Browning (2013), p 10.
68Jørgensen & Phillips (2002), p 43.
23
sult of discursive performances within the state, represented by contending parties and their
respective narratives about Sweden's identity. More specifically, what concerns this paper is
where to draw the boundaries for Sweden as a subject. A central question is how to perceive
the spatial boundaries for Sweden as a state. As the poststructural literature points out, identi-
ty is created in relation to the other, and by emphasizing certain historical alliances or threats,
narratives mold policymakers' way of thinking when developing a political position.69 Should
Sweden be seen simply as “Sweden”, a “Nordic state”, an “EU-member” or perhaps as a mere
fragment of a border-less global community? The narrative of the Self is connected to the nar-
ratives of spaces, or as Campbell phrases it; “the constitution of identity is achieved through
the inscription of boundaries that serves to demarcate an 'inside' from an 'outside,' a 'Self' from
an 'other,' a 'domestic' from a 'foreign'”.70
It is time to outline some central questions that will serve as guidelines for this study.
The first  question to be answered concerns the  spatial  boundaries  represented in the bio-
graphical narratives. Spatial boundaries are established through the performing of geographi-
cal limitations which include certain groups or individuals within a collective while simulta-
neously excluding others. These boundaries can be performed in subtle ways and not neces-
sarily by a direct statement which determines the lines of division. To locate a spatial “home”
means to study the assumptions about a collective “we” and an alien “other”. This meets gen-
eral principles of methods aimed at studying identities. As Hopf states, “finding identities” re-
quires us to ask the fundamental question on how both “we” and the “other” is described in a
text.71 The questions however make up two sides of the same coin, as the definition of a “we”
just as well may be articulated by the defining of a threatening “other”. By articulating outside
threats using specific narratives, some identities within the state may be forced to succumb
due to their incompatibility with such an identity.72 For this reason, this study pays attention to
both the Self and the Other. The following questions serve as guidelines for the empirical
study:
– What is included in the discursive performance of Sweden as we?
– How are threats defined?
69Subotić (2015), p 4.
70Campbell (1999), p 9.
71Hopf (2009), ”Identity relations and the Sino-Soviet split”, p 289. In Abdelal et al (ed.), 
Measuring Identity. 
72Aydin-Düzgit (2012), p 7.
24
The first question relates to spatial and ideational boundaries to the state. By examining how
political agents through discourse express assumptions about a group, one can acquire an un-
derstanding of the normative message they wish to convey. Assumptions about groups are not
normatively neutral, certainly not since political discourse often is directed straight to the pub-
lic as a way to establish a certain “truths”. By studying the discursive formation of groups,
one also gains an understanding of why some political alternatives are more feasible than oth-
ers; “Group formation is to be understood as a reduction of possibilities. People are constitut-
ed as groups through a process by which some possibilities of identification are put forward
as relevant while others are ignored.73 One could therefore expect a narrative defining a cer-
tain spatial boundary to also merge with an articulation of ideational boundaries. However,
emphasizing space and ideas separately provides more analytical clarity as it directs the atten-
tion to notions such as “democracy” or “freedom” as well as to spatial notions like “Europe”,
“Sweden” or “West”. Spatial and ideational boundaries can be associated with institutional ar-
rangements such the EU or the UN, which both represent spatio-ideational bodies. A state's
suggested – or assumed – role within such institutions is therefore a discursive performance of
group formation and the making of a “we”. In a study of Denmark's relation to the EU, Henrik
Larsen outlines a set of articulations which provide a useful framework for analyzing how
subjectivity is performed through discourses on states and their relation to institutions74 For
example, if a national politician narrates its state's action as “EU's action”, it silences the sub-
jectivity of the member state, while reproducing the EU as a taken for granted subject. Con-
versely, if the state is articulated as a unique, separate entity with accentuated virtues, it shifts
the subjectivity back to the state itself. In the ensuing study, Larsen's considerations serve as
useful guidelines in the study of identity formation.
The second question, regarding threats, shifts the attention to external elements of iden-
tity formation. To examine the performing of threats means to localize norms and actors from
which the speaking agent distances itself. The act of distancing may at its purest form appear
as guilt blaming and outspoken criticism toward the other. Defining others by assigning them
undesired attributes is one concrete way of limiting possibilities of action. As an example, in
his study of the United States' foreign policy Campbell shows how a discourse articulating an
emerging communist threat made it difficult to advance any alternative view able to challenge
the hegemonic anti-communist discourse.75 In the upcoming analysis, threats are broadly un-
73Jørgensen & Phillips (2002), p 44.
74See Larsen (2014), p 371.
75Campbell (1999), p 195-205.
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derstood as definitions of what the state must avoid becoming, whether such definitions in-
clude ideational or spatial limitations.
These two questions provide practical support in the following study of the empirical
material. Needless to say, these should not be seen as separate from one and other. Converse-
ly, each one may be viewed as inherently dependent on the other to define itself. The separa-
tion simply makes it more easy to grapple with the empirical material.
Two narrative events 
To examine discourses on state subjectivity, the following analysis draws upon two narrative
events  in  contemporary  debate  on  Swedish  foreign  policy.  The  first  narrative  event  is
constituted by formal presentations of foreign policy doctrine. The purpose of studying this
type of event is to attain a broad understanding of the identity tendencies in foreign policy
discourse. Due to the official nature of these narrative events, they are well suited for this
exact aim. The second narrative event relates to Sweden's candidature to the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) 2017-2018. Sweden's candidature was announced in 2004, but was
intensified  when the  Social  Democratic  Party  and the  Green Party formed  a  government
coalition in 2014.76 This event differs from the first in the sense that it more concretely relates
to Sweden's participation in international institutions; a successful candidature will result in a
two year tenure in the highest authoritative body of the UN. The candidature to the UNSC
makes up an intriguing case as it raises questions about Sweden's relation to the EU and the
CFSP to which Sweden has declared its commitment.
Empirical material
Meaningful analyzes of narratives or other forms of discourses benefit from the use of a wide
variety of genres. Different genres means different speaking situations, and by studying multi-
ple genres it is possible to see both dominating and unstable conceptions about the questions
outlined  for  this  study.  Broadly  speaking,  ”genres”  may  include  anything  from  political
76Statement of Government Policy ,3 October 2014.
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speeches,  policy documents,  debates,  literature,  movies and pictures. This study,  however,
rests exclusively on the first three genres.
A vital piece of material is the  Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary
Debate on Foreign Affairs77 (from now on simply “Foreign Policy Declaration”). These state-
ments are made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the annual debate on Sweden's foreign
policy. It is intended to in a comprehensive manner explain the course of the government's
foreign policy and is in this study used in conjunction with the Statement of Government Poli-
cy. As the latter describes national policy more broadly, the analysis is centered mainly on the
segment describing foreign policy. These two official documents allow for direct comparison
between two assumed rivals of the narrative of Sweden's subjectivity,  namely the Alliance
and the Social Democratic Party/Collaboration government. Political announcements of this
kind expose the actor's own account of its behavior, which is of highest interest for this study.
As stated previously, narratives are central elements in agency as they allow the actor to justi-
fy its  decisions  and avoid disharmony between action  and self-esteem. The government's
statement is itself announced in a forum where it channels its narratives to the press, the pub-
lic, and the political competitors, and by doing so it works as a justification directed toward
those likely to question its action. Committee bills are also used to sketch a broad narrative.
The Social Democratic Party's and the Moderate Party's respective bills “En rättvis värld” (“A
just  world”)  and  “Frihet  och  utveckling  i  världen”  (“Freedom  and  development  in  the
world”)78 serve as general accounts on the performance of Self. Since a substantial part of po-
litical debate takes place outside the parliament, press sources are also used in this study. The
analysis of the second narrative event – Sweden's candidature to the UNSC – is based primar-
ily on two parliamentary interpellations relating to the candidature.79
77Government Offices of Sweden (2014 & 2015), Statement of Government Policy in the 
Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs.
78Motion till riksdagen: 2013/14:U303; Motion till riksdagen 2014/15:2993.
79Interpellation 2013/14:102. Interpellation 2014/15:363.
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3. Identity in Swedish foreign policy
3.1 A voice for Europe or the World?
It is time to search for an answer to how the political discourse performs representations of a
“we” and its  “threats”.  It  is  worth  noting  that  these  questions  remain  intertwined,  which
makes it natural to grapple with both questions at the same time. As the title for this section
suggests in an intentionally simplified way, the point of departure assumes two opposing posi-
tions – one European and one global. Since this dilemma has been suggested in previous liter-
ature on Swedish foreign policy identity,  the following investigation employs this assumed
opposition as a theoretically supportive tool for the study of the empirical material. That being
said, it is important to question this very same construction of the mind.
The forthcoming analysis is organized in the following way: The first part of the study
sets out to broadly sketch out narratives in official foreign policy doctrine. By analyzing the
Statement of Government Policy and the Foreign Policy Declaration  including committee
bills, this part follows up on previous research's concern for the successive development of a
more pronounced “European identity” at the expense of a traditionally strong internationalist
rhetoric. The conclusions from this section are then applied in the succeeding section which
investigates the debate on Sweden's candidature to the UNSC.
Statements of Government Policy
The Alliance
In 2013, Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt presented the Alliance's most recent Statement of
Government Policy.80 In one of the opening paragraphs of the speech, Reinfeldt states that:
80Quotes from this source have been translated by the author. 
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When we take in our surrounding world we are remembered about Sweden's virtues. The possibili-
ties it entails to grow up in a country which has peace, a well developed democracy and a sound
welfare. […] there is also reason to reflect on how the world views us. Although we are a small
country, many eyes are turned on us. When USA's president Barack Obama recently visited us, we
discussed Sweden's economy and how we resisted the crisis. How more of openness and trade is
good for growth in the whole world and often increases the resistance against crisis.81
The statement advances two basic conceptions about Sweden. First it underlines the values of
peace, a well developed democracy and a good welfare system. This harmonizes with the
stereotypical picture of Sweden described in earlier research. In the second part, Reinfeldt is
slightly more specific, claiming that Sweden's success depends on policies of openness and
promotion of international trade. Reinfeldt continues the argument in the following paragraph,
stating that “our ability to unify competitive growth economy, successful enterprises, and high
welfare ambitions with reduced impact on the climate awakens interest”.82 The foreign policy
segment of the statement explains Sweden's relations to the rest of the world, putting certain
emphasis on Sweden's role as a part of the EU. In the introductory paragraph, Reinfeldt states
that “Sweden should be an active part of a strong, united, and open Europe. A Europe which
rises strengthened from the economic crisis and which is more capable to assert its interests
on the international arena.”83 This position reflects the notion of a “European identity” as it
calls for a united and strong Europe. Consequently,  Sweden's subjectivity is articulated as
subordinate to the EU, which in turn is ascribed a higher purpose. The next paragraph goes on
to emphasize the benefits of being part of the union; “[a]ccess to the world's largest unitary
market – as a consumer and producer. The possibility to study, travel, or work in any of EU's
28 member states. But also a unique opportunity for Sweden and other European countries to
jointly meet the great challenges we face.”84 The strongest bonds, however, are those Sweden
shares with its fellow Nordic countries, which is explained by the “deep roots” of this com-
munity of neighboring countries.85 However, the Nordic community remains undefined and
never receives far less attention than the EU. The formulations regarding the Eastern partner-
ship (EaP), in which Sweden has been one of the driving forces, further signals an assumption
of a spatial unity between Sweden and the EU: “The challenges in our eastern neighborhood
remain. […] But the difficulties do not change the fact that it is a strong Swedish interest to
81Government Offices of Sweden (2013) Statement of Government Policy, p 1.
82Government Offices of Sweden (2013) Statement of Government Policy, p 1.
83Government Offices of Sweden (2013) Statement of Government Policy, p 11.
84Government Offices of Sweden (2013) Statement of Government Policy, p 11.
85Government Offices of Sweden (2013) Statement of Government Policy, p 11.
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develop and strengthen the European Union's politics for the countries in the Eastern partner-
ship.”86 The Eastern neighborhood is articulated as “our” challenge, which suggests that Swe-
den and the EU share equal challenges through common spatial boundaries. The notion of
“Eastern neighborhood” itself represents a politico-spatial articulation which merges the sub-
jectivity of Sweden with that of the EU. One may rightly ask if countries such as Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine really are neighbors of Sweden given the political
and spatial distances.  This would obviously make little sense,  because the concept of “East-
ern neighborhood” refers exclusively to the expansion of “our” European collective. When
Bildt talks about the challenges in “our eastern neighborhood”, he then talks about the chal-
lenges in EU's neighborhood. Sweden's subjectivity is again defined in relation to the EU,
when Reinfeldt asserts that Sweden should be a “strong voice for an open union prepared to
accept new members”.87
The Collaboration government
The Collaboration government's Statement of Government Policy from 2014 offers a quite
different view on Sweden's state identity. In an initial paragraph of his statement, Prime Min-
ister Stefan Löfvén expresses the new government's view of what Sweden should be:
Our country should be a leading and inspiring force in the world. [---] It is this government's firm
will to make Sweden a global example, in our development, our equality, and our leadership in
fighting climate change. A country characterized by peoples' equal value,  confidence, solidarity
and the belief that the future can be changed.88
Löfvén assigns slightly different virtues to Sweden than Reinfeldt, who rather accentuated
peace, democracy, and open trade policies as the recipe for Sweden's success. Löfvén's state-
ment echoes the rhetoric from the past by articulating Sweden's uniqueness, or “critical edge”
as Agius phrases it. Although the Alliance's statement pronounces a set of attributes assigned
to Sweden, it does not bear the self-inspirational narrative apparent in Löfvén's statement.
Löfvén's speech describes Sweden as an “inspiring force”, a “global example” and a country
with “confidence”, words which were nearly absent in the Alliance's official statement. This
narrative is further illustrated when Löfvén claims that “Sweden should be a strong voice in
the world for freedom, peace, human rights, and solidarity. We shall actively participate in the
86Government Offices of Sweden (2013) Statement of Government Policy, p 12. Emphasis added.
87Government Offices of Sweden (2013) Statement of Government Policy, p 13.
88Government Offices of Sweden (2014) Statement of Government Policy, p 1.
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international cooperation, so that both the UN and the EU take responsibility to solve the con-
flicts and give aid to those in need”.89 In comparison to the Alliance's statement, the Collabo-
ration government is more eager to add “global” or “world” when defining the course of Swe-
den's foreign policy. This is also evident in the segment about the EU and the Eastern neigh-
borhood – described as one of  our biggest  challenges  – where Löfvén adds that  Sweden
should work for a union which takes responsibility for development and security not only
within the proximity of the EU, but also globally.90 The assertion advances the idea that the
EU not only bears regional but also global responsibilities, thus challenging the significance
of the spatial boundaries of Europe and its neighboring areas. EU's responsibilities in terms of
development and security do not end at the border to Central Asia. The Collaboration govern-
ment's call for EU to pronounce a more distinct global ambition points to a tendency to differ-
entiate the Swedish state subjectivity from the EU. The following passage demonstrates this
point effectively:
Sweden  should  be  an  engaged and  constructive member  of  the  European  Union.  Prioritized
Swedish interests will be pushed for actively. Issues related to the increasing of jobs, an ordered
labor market, increased equality, and progressive environment and climate policies are of certain
interests. EU's crisis resolution must develop both globally and in EU's neighborhood.91
The choice of words reveals a shift from the Alliance's more positive view on the EU. First of
all, the statement leaves out the previous formulation which claimed that Sweden should be
an “active part of a strong, united, and open Europe”, challenging the narrative performing
Europe as one coherent subject. The Collaboration government does not argue that Sweden
should be an “active part” but rather an “engaged” and “constructive” member which actively
promotes Sweden's “prioritized interests”. Perhaps one could argue that these examples mere-
ly illustrate semantic variations,  but considering the situation in which these text are pro-
duced, each word have been carefully selected before being printed on paper. One plausible
interpretation is that the Collaboration government by replacing “active” with “engaged” and
“constructive” attempts to display Sweden's independence as a both a progressive leader and a
critic within the EU. Technically, being active in the context of the EU could simply mean to
cast a vote, while “engaged” suggests a more spirited participation in EU affairs. The meaning
of being “constructive” is equally hard to determine; one interpretation is that it refers to the
89Government Offices of Sweden (2014) Statement of Government Policy, p 16. Emphasis added.
90Government Offices of Sweden (2014) Statement of Government Policy, p 16.
91Government Offices of Sweden (2014) Statement of Government Policy, p 18.
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future improvement of the EU, since the segment proceeds by making constructive demands
for reforms of EU's crisis  resolution.  The paragraph also makes  an important  point  when
declaring that prioritized, Swedish interests will be pursued actively. By explicitly pronounc-
ing the mere existence of Swedish interests, this articulation reproduces Sweden as a separate
subject with interests potentially distinguishable from the EU.
Foreign Policy Declarations
The Alliance 
The Alliance's Foreign Policy Declaration begins by stating that Sweden's foreign policy is
based on those values carrying “our” society and interests that are “ours”.92 Sweden is here
vaguely articulated as a separate subject in possession of specific values and interests. The
succeeding paragraphs, however, bring back the European narrative by directly referring to a
common European history. Bildt reminds the parliament of the shots fired in Sarajevo and the
ensuing wars which plagued Europe for seventy-five years before Europe could unite and heal
its wounds. The fall of the Berlin wall is then described as the moment when ideological ob-
stacles were shattered, leading to the rise of democracy and forging of new bonds.93 As the
Moderate Party states in their committee bill, the European cooperation has historically se-
cured freedom, peace, and democracy among its member states. It is described as a coopera-
tion deeply founded on set of common values and a consolidated European interest.94 The em-
phasis on Europe's shared subjectivity is explicitly illustrated by the following passage:
For most of these states [member states joining after the Cold war], [the fall of the Berlin wall]
was the ultimate confirmation that the brutal oppression of the iron curtain had been replaced with
the hopefulness of European integration. The history of Europe – our history – reminds us of the
horrors of war and dictatorship, but also of the phenomenal power of cooperation and freedom.
And of the duty that our generation – and the next – has to discharge and cultivate.95
92Government Offices of Sweden (2014) Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary 
Debate on Foreign Affairs, p 1.
93Government Offices of Sweden (2014) Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary 
Debate on Foreign Affairs, p 1.
94Motion till riksdagen 2014/15:2993, p 8-11.
95Government Offices of Sweden (2014) Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary 
Debate on Foreign Affair, p 1.
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This narrative distinctly links the definition of “we” with that of “Europe”, which gives the
European bond precedence over alternative definitions of Sweden's state identity. Sweden is
not only spatially and politically connected to Europe, but also historically and morally. Com-
mon suffering of brutal oppression are put forward as the basis for European unity along with
a phenomenal power of cooperation and freedom. “Sweden's history” is pushed aside in favor
of a narrative which instead accentuates a coherent European past. It continues to produce a
European subjectivity by claiming that “our generation” – which presumably refers to Euro-
peans – must discharge and cultivate a certain duty. The declaration continues:
And to those voices – in Sweden and in the rest of Europe – who want to dismantle or weaken Eu-
ropean cooperation we want to send a clear message: the historical responsibility for breaking
down European cooperation will be a heavy burden to bear.  Weakening European cooperation
means weakening the prospects for welfare and development.96
The statement implies that those arguing against the EU are essentially wrong. European co-
operation is equaled with prosperity and progress, while voices against such cooperation are
dismissed and left for the future to judge. The tone in Bildt's statement is more accusing in a
following statement in which he claims that “[t]he forces of opposition to this open coopera-
tion – xenophobia and [euro-hostility]97 – go hand in hand. We must combat this coalition of
narrow-mindedness with vigour and conviction.”98 The opposition against European coopera-
tion is here directly pointed out, although still obscurely described in terms of xenophobia and
euro-hostility.  The notion “euro-hostility” itself explains close to nothing about what these
forces of opposition are hostile against. At first, one may ask if euro-hostility is intended to be
equaled with xenophobia, If not, what does it refer to? Economic policies of the EU? Inter-
governmental organizations in general? Some kind of cultural trait of the European continent?
The answer appear somewhat hazy, but the Moderate Party's committee bill from the follow-
ing year gives a clearer message: “The European cooperation is a common construction of
values against  protectionism, nationalism and myths about self-sufficiency”.99 It  is evident
that the notion of euro-hostility adds a distinct threat definition to the formulation of state
96Government Offices of Sweden (2014) Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary 
Debate on Foreign Affair, p 1-2.
97The official translation says ”euroscepticism”, while Bildt himself uses the word 
”Europafientligheten”.  ”Euro-hostility” is a more adequate translation given the phrasing in the 
original speech.
98Government Offices of Sweden (2014) Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary 
Debate on Foreign Affairs, p 2.
99Motion till riksdagen 2014/15:2993, p 8-9.
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identity. Also, by bundling together those holding euro-hostility with xenophobia, this narra-
tive illustrates a case of “guilt-by-association” in which a vaguely defined group of EU-critics
is accused for xenophobia. This discourse is apparently imbued with tendencies from the con-
temporary domestic debate in Sweden in which xenophobia is attached to so called extreme
right-wing parties such as the Sweden Democrats. By placing the Sweden Democrats under
the same roof as proponents of euro-hostility the narrative creates an ambiguous threat catego-
ry. In such a category it is theoretically possible for the Sweden Democrats and the Left Party,
which strongly opposes the former's ideology, to perfectly fit together. In sum, the concept of
euro-hostility both entrenches an axiomatic idea of a unified European subject and upholds a
vague conception of an anti-European threat. Xenophobia, nationalism, narrow-mindedness
and so called myths of self-sufficiency are lumped together and labeled with the intangible
notion of euro-hostility.
The idea of a European subject reappears throughout the Foreign Policy Declaration.
“Our Europe is a global Europe”, says Bildt before explaining the EU's relations to non-Euro-
pean countries across the world. Bildt asserts that Sweden is devoted to a EU which strength-
ens its links to other global actors, stating that “[w]e want to see an ambitious transatlantic
trade and investment partnership between the EU and the United States by 2015”, and that
“[w]e want to see a relationship with Russia that rests on respect for international rules, insti-
tutions and principles”. Bildt continues, making clear that “[w]e want to see a more extensive
European partnership with China”, and that “we want the EU to deepen its cooperation with
countries such as Brazil, India and South Africa on important issues concerning the climate,
research and economic growth”.100 These statements continuously sustain the European narra-
tive by defining relations as something between x and the EU. The political interests formulat-
ed in the text are not connected to Sweden but to Europe, which takes the shape of a homoge-
neous subject possessing certain given interests. Sweden nor any other member state are ex-
plicitly differentiated from the EU. This point is further illuminated by the following message:
Our Europe is a Europe with a clear foreign policy vision. […] At the European Council meeting
in December, a further step was taken toward realising the Swedish proposal on a European global
strategy. Work is now being stepped up to formulate the EU's international goals and interests in
our surroundings.101
100Government Offices of Sweden (2014) Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary 
Debate on Foreign Affairs, p 5. The note refers to all five quotes.
101Regeringskansliet (2014) Regeringens deklaration vid 2014 års utrikespolitiska debatt i 
Riksdagen onsdagen den 19 februari 2014, p 5. 
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Sweden is here pronounced as a more driving actor, yet still as an actor with the overarching
goal of achieving a unified European global strategy. The emphasis on Sweden's proposal for
a global strategy however articulates Sweden's subjectivity as possibly different from others.
The segment which specifies Sweden's relation to the UN provides some support for this ob-
servation. Bildt states that; “Given our national commitment to global multilateral coopera-
tion, it is natural that we promote a European Union that contributes to the UN's work, not
least in the lives and reality of vulnerable people.102 This assertion reflects previous research's
descriptions of Sweden as a committed proponent for the UN as a forum for cooperation. The
brief mentioning of a “national commitment” hints of something possibly unique for the state
of Sweden, but as the focus directly shifts toward the EU, little or no effort is made to formu-
late a specific Swedish subject. Sweden is not the central agent in the UN, the EU is.
It is evident that the Alliance make limited efforts in distinguishing Sweden as unique
and different from the EU. The observations of some scholars therefore seem to be fairly ac-
curate. It requires skill to point out any signs of a Nordic or a Swedish brand, nor is it possible
to see any clear attempts to emphasize Sweden's “critical edge” in relation to others. This is a
result of a manifest narrative in which the “we” is spatially, ideationally, and also historically
linked to the idea of Europe. This biographical narrative gives little space to articulate Sweden
as a subject – which is likely to have political consequences – and also makes it possible to ar-
ticulate threats by creating dichotomies between EU or anti-EU. The broader implications of
this will be discussed in the conclusion of this section.
The Collaboration government
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Margot Wallström begins her Foreign Policy Declaration by
making the following claim:
We share a common destiny, and we do so at a time of greater insecurity. [---] Our common des-
tiny confers two main tasks on Swedish foreign policy. We must make the most of the benefits,
which are so significant. And we must manage the risks. Our foreign policy is therefore focused on
broad  international  collaboration  and  cooperation:  with  our  neighbours,  within  the  European
Union, and as a more active member of the United Nations.103
102Government Offices of Sweden (2014) Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary 
Debate on Foreign Affairs, p 7.
103Government Offices of Sweden (2015) Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary 
Debate on Foreign Affairs, p 1. Emphasis added.
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Notable in this opening passage is the comparatively imprecise definition of the “we”. This
marks a difference to the Alliance's declaration which explicitly develops a narrative in which
a pronounced “European destiny” is at stake. This vagueness perhaps make more sense con-
sidering  previous  research's  observations  of  Swedish  social  democracy.  As  af  Malmborg
claims, the traditional neutrality rhetoric to which the Social Democratic Party has adhered
rests on a so called Mitranian view on peace. The Mitranian view holds that peace must be
reached universally,  as regional federations risk to produce rivalries between whole conti-
nents.104 The political shift toward a more active role in the UN – a global rather than a re-
gional organization – can be understood as a way to maintain such a Mitranian ambition.
Similar narratives to those in the Alliance's declaration do however also appear in the
Collaboration government's statement, which adds a certain blur to the line between the op-
posing parties. As an example, Wallström argues that a strong and concerted EU is a Swedish
interest and that Sweden's voice is stronger when joined with other EU member states.105 As
in the Alliance's declaration, the EU is articulated as an almost monolithic institution through
which “Sweden's voice” can be channeled to gain strength. Although the statement leans to-
ward a europeanized view of the subject, it is comparatively weak in comparison to Bildt's de-
scription of a common European history.
The Collaboration government's move away from a eurocentric definition of the Self is
reflected by the decision to restore UN's place in Sweden's foreign policy. “We want, and are
able to take responsibility for joint solutions through the UN. Sweden's candidacy for a seat
on the UN Security Council in 2017-2018 is a concrete expression of the Government's desire
to influence the course of global politics”106, says Wallström, without mentioning the EU as
part of the “we”. The “we” is instead defined as “Sweden” and “the Government”. In this con-
nection, Wallström continues to describe the global ambitions of Sweden's foreign policy,
stating that:
Through the UN we can take a number of important steps, and 2015 is a key year for global ef-
forts. To achieve peace and development, we need initiatives for democracy, sustainable develop-
104af Malmborg (2001), p 187.
105Government Offices of Sweden (2015) Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary 
Debate on Foreign Affairs, p 1-2.
106Government Offices of Sweden (2015) Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary 
Debate on Foreign Affairs, p 2.
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ment, gender equality and prudent use of our natural resources […] At this year's climate confer-
ence in Paris, Sweden's goal is to reach a global, fair and legally binding climate agreement [...]107
A shift to a foreign policy which advocates a more vigorous engagement in the UN is directly
linked to the need for articulating Sweden as a unique subject. By saying that “Sweden will be
a bridge-builder and have a strong voice in international development policy”108 Wallström at-
taches subjectivity to Sweden, and creates incentives for the renewed prioritization of the UN.
As stated earlier, and actor needs to know who it is before knowing what to do. By defining
“who” Sweden is, Wallström provides an explanation for the goals her government decides to
pursue. If Sweden is distinct from the EU, then it is plausible to suggest a more pronounced
Swedish agenda in the UN.
The shift away from a eurocentric narrative is perhaps best illustrated by the reoccurring
reference to the “common destiny”.109 Just as in the opening piece of the statement, Wallström
raises the concept when summarizing the declaration:
The values that guide Swedish foreign policy still stand out as an uncommonly modern basis on
which to organise a community. Cooperation with our neighbours, to guarantee peace and create
common security. Solidarity that knows no borders, aimed at increasing equality and eradicating
poverty. […] These are the building blocks for a foreign and security policy to feed into a broader
discussion in our country. A policy that is guided by the necessity of common security and the re -
alisation that we share a common destiny. The Government is determined that, in these unsettled
times, Sweden will take global responsibility by being a strong voice in the world.110
The Collaboration government changes the narrative from centering on a European to a global
“we”. Compared with the European subject performed by the Alliance's declarations, this sub-
ject is more vaguely defined in spatial terms. Sweden is obviously not fully separable from
the EU – such rhetoric would be surprising coming from a member state of the union – but
clearly defined as something more exceptional than the EU, and certainly more connected to
some undefined collective outside the borders of Europe. The notion of a “common destiny”
107Government Offices of Sweden (2015) Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary 
Debate on Foreign Affairs, p 4. Emphasis added.
108Government Offices of Sweden (2015) Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary 
Debate on Foreign Affairs, p 4.
109The actual word used by Wallström is ”ödesgemenskap”.
110Government Offices of Sweden (2015) Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary 
Debate on Foreign Affairs, p 8. Emphasis added.
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reappears in an earlier speech at the Swedish United Nations Association's seminar to which
Wallström attended. In her speech, Wallström holds that:
We share what Olof Palme once described as a “common destiny” [---] “I look forward being [re-
placed]  by people like [Nobel peace  prize laureate]  Malala and by new generations  of  young
politicians when we together shape the answer of one the most important questions of our time:
how the UN, our most important global actor, should be used to handle the common destiny of the
citizens of the world.111 
In sum, the Collaboration government conveys a messages based on a firm internationalism.
The spatial boundaries are not as explicitly defined as in the Alliance's statement. Moreover,
by creating an internationalist narrative the Collaboration government also permits itself to
sketch a distinct Swedish brand. In terms of threats, this narrative is not as specific as the Al-
liance's. Perhaps this is due to the strong internationalist convictions within the Social Demo-
cratic tradition in which a Mitranian vision remains prevalent. One likely interpretation is that
the threat to Swedish state subjectivity instead stems from increasing regionalization which
would threaten the social democratic identity and vision of a Swedish exceptionalism. How-
ever, any clear threat definitions remain absent in the material studied in this paper.
An ambiguous state identity
Foreign policy doctrines of sub-state actors point toward an evident ambiguity in Swedish
state identity. The Alliance's position illustrates how the state subjectivity is ontologically se-
curitized  through the establishing of a firm European identity which embodies both common
values and a shared European history. The world-view is based on a European unity which
corresponds to what Brommesson has described as a “normatively europeanized foreign poli-
cy”.  The analysis  of the Collaboration  government's  foreign policy however  shows that  a
strict normative europeanization is simultaneously challenged by a comparatively internation-
alist foreign policy doctrine. A world-view based on an idea of a common destiny and a prin-
cipal belief in broad international cooperation are apparent throughout the Collaboration gov-
ernment's policy declarations. This division, which despite some overlapping tendencies is
111Speech at the Swedish United Nations Association's seminar 22 October 2014.  
http://www.svt.se/nyheter/svtforum/fn-och-islamiska-staten-granslosa-utmaningar. Emphasis 
added.
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clearly visible,  points to the continuation  of contesting identities  and narratives  about  the
Swedish state subjectivity.  Despite clear consensus on the institutional integration with the
EU, the matter of Sweden's state identity – its interests, values, history and affiliations – is far
from settled. The shift from an internationalist to a europeanized foreign policy identity ap-
pears to be experiencing what appears to be a backlash. As the following section shows more
concretely, these contesting identities provide fundamental support for political action.
3.2 Sweden's candidature to the UNSC
Sweden's  candidature  to the UNSC is a political  goal  supported by all  parties  within the
Swedish parliament.112 Despite overall agreement regarding the candidature itself, the issue
lends  itself  well  to  display  diverging  views  on the  matter  of  Swedish  state  identity.  The
surrounding debate  on the candidature  serves  as  a  narrative  event  in  which  identities  are
pronounced and defended against  each  other.  It  is  important  to  underscore that   political
action and identity formation are inherently connected.  As stated previously,  interests  and
identities  are  mutually  constituted,  as  agents  refrain  form  acting  in  ways  which  cause
disharmony with their biographical narrative, causing what Steele calls “discursive remorse”.
To maintain  ontological  security,  the agent  has to assure stability  and continuity between
action and Self. The following analysis continues the discussion from the preceding section
and links it to the debate on the candidature to the UNSC.
The Swedish candidature was announced in 2004, but little or no activity was noticeable
during the first ten years.113 In November 2013, social democratic MP Urban Ahlin, questions
the lack of activity in the candidature, asking which measures the Alliance government plan to
take to be successful. In the answer, Bildt declares that although Sweden historically has had a
strong commitment to the UN and that a strong and effective UN lies in Sweden's interest, the
candidature should be based on Sweden's merits  instead of so called “shuttle diplomacy”.
Bildt asserts that one must acknowledge the limitations of the UN and actively try to mitigate
these, continuing to argue that “[a] romanticized picture of the UN benefits no one, very least
112”Olika syn på vägen till FN:s säkerhetsråd”, Svenska Dagbladet, published 2015-04-06. 
http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/olika-syn-pa-vagen-till-fns-sakerhetsrad_4463953.svd. 
113 This was due to overlapping candidatures such as Sweden's own candidature to the United 
Nations Human Rights Council and Finland's candidature to the UNSC.
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the UN itself”.114 Social democratic MP Monica Green responds by saying that the Alliance
government has lost its interest in the UN and that Sweden's reputation, opposite to what Bildt
argues,  has  declined  within  the  UN.115 Green's  argument  draws  upon Ahlin  and Löfvén's
critique put forward in an article in Dagens Nyheter. In this article, Ahlin and Löfvén argue
that the Alliance government has been silencing Sweden's voice in the UN by trying to hide
away the UNSC candidature through proposing coordinated candidature cycles between EU
member states. Ahlin and Löfvén contend that to assure Sweden's influence, Sweden has to
develop a UN strategy not only together with the EU and the Nordic countries, but as an
individual state bearing a historically steadfast commitment to the UN.116
The social  democrats'  arguments for a potent candidature is clearly based on a self-
esteem imbued with a consciousness about Sweden's historical role within the UN. This is
explicitly expressed by MP Green when she asserts that “we can engage ourselves more in the
UN. We have a proud history to look back at, and Bildt should make use of this record more
than he does”.117 By establishing a narrative in which Sweden is understood as a committed
and internationalist  state  actor,  the social  democrats  align their  interests  and identity  in  a
consistent order which enables the securitization of their subjectivity. The commitment to the
candidature can be viewed as both a “result” of an internationalist identity, but also as a way
to reinforce that identity through political action.
The debate continued as the Collaboration government was installed and started running
the candidature on a higher gear. The Alliance's reaction to the formally announced intention
to intensify the candidature118 is captured by an interpellation posed by MP Sofia Damm, who
serves as the Christian Democrats' spokesperson on foreign policy. Two central topics can be
identified in Damm's interpellation to Wallström. The first topic concerns the meaningfulness
of the political priority itself, considering the UNSC's limited efficiency in conflict mediation.
The second topic refers to the framing of the candidature, which Damm views as potentially
contradictory  to  the  notion  of  a  common European foreign  policy.  Damm holds  that  the
Collaboration government's claim to have an interest in a unified EU is inconsistent with the
prioritization of the UNSC candidature, as it entails competition with EU member states.119 
114Interpellation 2013/14:102. Anf. 2.
115Interpellation 2013/14:102. Anf. 3.
116”Sveriges röst måste bli tydlig och stark i FN”, Dagens Nyheter, published 2013-10-08.
117Interpellation 2013/14:102. Anf. 9.
118See Statement of Government Policy and Foreign Policy Declarations from 2014 and 2015 
respectively.
119Interpellation 2014/15:363.Anf. 58.
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The need for a unified European foreign policy is stronger than in a very long time. We have heard
this not least in today's debate. There is ongoing war in Sweden's neighborhood, and in terms of
security  policy  it  is  remarkable  to  in  the  [UNSC]  campaign  slogan,  “Global  commitment,
independent voice” raise and emphasize Sweden's independence.  […] I would like to hear  the
Minister for Foreign Affairs develop the reasoning regarding the independent foreign policy. Why
this rhetoric? What are we independent from?120
Damm's questions point to the central conflict line between the two political groupings. The
questions reflect a concern for a foreign policy which shifts not only rhetoric but also political
action  from  dependence  to  independence.  The  issue  of  Sweden's  state  subjectivity  thus
emerges  at  the core of the debate.  The response from social  democratic  MP Olle Thorell
furthermore shows that the subject position of Sweden needs to be negotiated to meet the two
seemingly contrasting identities of normative europeanization and strong internationalism.
I would like to question Sofia Damm's view on dependence and independence. Sweden is a loyal
EU member – nobody could say anything else.  That is how it  is, and how it  should be.  It  is
important that we speak with one voice in EU contexts. But this does not mean that we have
ceased to have our own voice.  We have not ceased to exist  as a country.  We exist.  We have
opinions. We have values we stand for. We say what we mean, and we mean what we are saying.
We are independent in the EU, but we are not independent from the EU – this in an important
distinction.121
It seems as if the candidature needs to satisfy two contrasting identities to appear as a feasible
political  effort.  Despite  the  Collaboration  government's  articulation  of  an  internationalist
foreign  policy  based on a  narrative  of  common destinies  and unique  Swedish  brand,  the
slogan  “Global  commitment,  independent  voice”  evidently  lacks  full  support  from  the
parliament. Thorell's response to Damm shows that the commitment to the EU and the CFSP
has become such a fundamental facet of Swedish state identity that behavior challenging the
idea of a unified EU must be met with modifications in self-identity. This is further illustrated
by Wallström's response that “[w]e absolutely do not have tunnel vision. We work actively
with our EU engagement, just as we do with the UN engagement”.122 In 1 May 2015, the
Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  dropped  the  slogan,  after  criticism from the  opposition  and
conservative columnists who maintained that the CFSP leaves no room for an independent
120Interpellation 2014/15:363. Anf. 58.
121Interpellation 2014/15:363. Anf. 59.
122Interpellation 2014/15:363. Anf. 63.
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Swedish voice. The critics argue that issues brought up in the UNSC in any case ought to be
prepared within the EU, making an independent Swedish voice rather obsolete.123 Against this
background it makes sense to ask why the Collaboration government, obviously aware of this
fact, would go on with such an approach to the UNSC candidature. The quick withdrawal of
the slogan indicates that the idea itself was poorly thought through. Although the high priority
of the candidature may accurately correspond with an internationalist identity, it appears to
cause a “discursive remorse” when clashing with a normatively europeanized foreign policy
identity. In the case of Sweden, a state which bears a tradition of parliamentary consensus on
foreign policy124, this matter could clearly be difficult to master, as the candidature relies on
broad support from all political parties represented in the parliament. This is clearly displayed
by Wallström's repeated expressions of appreciation for the opposing parties' general support
of the candidature.125
This dilemma captures the theoretical discussion outlined previously, which emphasized
the merits of viewing the state as a product of negotiations between various conflicting sub-
state identities. In this case, such negotiations seem to not yet have halted the Collaboration
government's  ambition  to  make  the  UNSC candidature  a  top  priority  despite  a  modified
campaign slogan. Quite oppositely, the Social Democratic Party's idea of the state's Self as
uniquely internationalist appears to still heavily influence the intensity and character of the
candidature. The narratives of Sweden as a strong global voice and a bridge-builder reappear
whether  the  Collaboration  government  champions  its  own  candidature  or  criticizes  the
Alliance's more modest configuration. Wallström holds that a seat on the security council not
should be underestimated and that it would be meaningful having “an important and strong
voice in the security council which can cooperate with others, which does not have an hidden
agenda, and which is used to being a bridge-builder”.126 This narrative serves, just  as the
Alliance's europeanized narrative, to uphold and remind the actor itself about  who they are.
As a reminder; an actor needs to know who it is before knowing  what to do. If one draws
upon a narrative which articulates Sweden as a subject with a unique “critical edge”, the use
of campaign slogans such as “global commitment” and “independent voice” appear not only
as feasible but also appropriate. Conversely, with europeanized narratives, such notions cause
123”UD backar från omstridd slogan”, Dagens Nyheter, published: 2015-05-01.
124For example, see Bjereld & Demker (1995).
125See interpellation 2014/15:363 and 2013/14:102 for some examples.
126Interpellation 2014/15:363. Anf. 63.
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discursive remorse and an insecurity regarding the state as a subject. This could explain the
Alliance's comparatively careful approach to the candidature.
A central aspect of the debate also relates to the valuation of the UNSC's capacity as an
international institution. Bildt argues that global impact best can be achieved through joint EU
effort “although this might  not be consistent with old Swedish imaginations” and that the
possibility to influence the UNSC is limited for non-permanent members.127 Center-Party MP
Kerstin Lundgren holds that a seat on the UNSC is easily overestimated as it remains blocked
by its permanent members. “One cannot resolve Ukraine, one cannot resolve Syria. This is
one's task, to secure peace, and one does not manage to do it”.128 Oppositely, Wallström and
State  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Annika  Söder,  instead  stress  the  positive  effects  of  a
successful candidature, holding the council as a unique platform for Sweden to promote its
peace policy and affect the course of world politics. Söder says that “[w]e want the Security
Council  to  work  better,  make  more  countries  realize  that  politics  about  war  and  peace
ultimately  are  about  people.  Real  power  is  not  only  about  muscles  but  also  about
cooperation.”129 Although these reflections share the opinion that the UNSC currently lacks
efficiency, the views on Sweden's role on the council are quite different. Apart from asserting
the relative redundancy of advancing a particular Swedish voice on the council – a collective
EU position is already present through the presence of Great Britain and France – the Alliance
is less optimistic about the prospects for institutional change. The Collaboration government's
optimism toward such a change follows the internationalist and Mitranian ideal of universality
and equality between states instead of regions.
This analysis illustrates that the branding of Sweden's foreign policy is a rather difficult
endeavor. The definition of the state subject – its relations, its history and its virtues – is too
ambiguous to create a consistent brand of what Sweden is and what it represents. With the
Social Democratic Party's return to power, some sort of Swedish brand however appears to be
under reconstruction. The current branding of Sweden, as illustrated by the narrative events
presented in this study, points to a tendency to awaken the notion of exceptionalism and that
foreign policy will  follow the  same course,  despite  obvious  challenges.  The concern  that
Sweden would lose its self-perceived exceptionalism through the establishing of a European
identity thus seems to be momentarily appeased.
127https://carlbildt.wordpress.com/2015/03/30/om-sverige-och-fns-sakerhetsrad-och-allt-detta/, 
2015-05-18, 12.40.
128”Olika syn på vägen till FN:s säkerhetsråd”, Svenska Dagbladet, published 2015-04-06. 
http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/olika-syn-pa-vagen-till-fns-sakerhetsrad_4463953.svd. 
129http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/18334/a/250349, 2015-05-18, 14.34.
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4. Conclusion
This paper has investigated Sweden's state subjectivity through the analysis of biographical
narratives  in  foreign  policy  doctrine  and  debate.  By  departing  from  the  constructivist
supposition claiming that subjects are given meaning through performative actions, this paper
shows that Sweden as a state subject embodies contrasting ideas on the state's Self. It has been
argued that the Collaboration government, lead by the Social Democratic Party, has embraced
a narrative in which Swedish exceptionalism still is present, and in which the world is tied
together by an idea of a common destiny. Conversely, the Alliance maintains a normatively
europeanized foreign policy which holds European history and values at its core. Needless to
say, these conclusions are analytical constructions based on ideal types and ought to be seen
as robust categorizations rather than exact reflections of a complex case. In spite of obvious
nuances, this study holds firmly to the conclusion that Sweden's state identity currently passes
through an ambivalent phase in which an internationalist identity is being reincarnated. The
Collaboration government's doctrine demonstrates a world-view and set of priorities which
rest  on an internationalist  narrative  embedded with references  to  historical  roles and past
commitments.  Conversely,  the  Alliance's  narrative  of  a  spatially  and  ideationally  united
Europe explains the strong adherence to the EU as a collective project. Both cases illustrate
how actions and a sense of Self are linked through political discourse, and illuminates the
need for ontological security. 
This conclusion does not claim that biographical narratives determine an agent's actions.
How interests  are  created  in  the first  place  depends on more  than  just  identity,  although
identity is indeed fundamental. What “causes” the Alliance's commitment to the EU or the
Collaboration  government's  prioritization  of  the  UN  is  of  course  also  a  question  about
ideology and rationality. The purpose is not to entitle identity the status of master explanation
but  to  show that  ideology,  rationality  and identity  instead  are  closely interrelated.  As an
intrinsic  component  to  identity,  ideology  obviously  matters,  however  not  apart  from the
perception of the Self. Rationality, likewise, should not be seen as predefined and exogenous
to identity, but as formed endogenously. Rationality is simply inconceivable without any prior
understanding of identity.  The debate on the UNSC candidature illustrates this by showing
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how  sub-state  actors  draw  upon  different  biographical  narratives  on  state-identity  to
rationalize their  positions. However,  this  paper only sketches a broad picture of Sweden's
foreign policy identity and is also limited to one single example. Future research within this
field may find the “Feminist  Foreign Policy”  and Löfvén's  so called  “New Global  Deal”
particularly interesting for closer study, being two high-reaching political undertakings by the
Collaboration government.
From a broader perspective, a Swedish brand appears to have reemerged with the Social
Democratic  Party's  return to  government.  Equally intriguing is  the parallel  articulation  of
what could best be described as a European brand. In spite of the fundamental agreement on
the importance of a unified EU, the Alliance – with Bildt as its nucleus – makes a noteworthy
effort to articulate threats stemming from what is described as a “euro-hostility”. This type of
threat-laden narrative is presumably an expression of an anxiety over a European identity
currently undergoing heavy crisis. In this context, a stable narrative about a solid European
identity  serves  to  preserve  EU  cohesion  as  a  sensible  political  aim.  Moreover,  the
synchronous  advancement  of  a  European and an exceptional  Swedish  brand respectively,
underscores the non-fixed constitution of the state subject. Just as anarchy is what states make
of it, states and supranational institutions gain their purpose through continuously performed
actions.  The  state  certainly  resembles  a  subject  because  of  its  current  function  in  the
international  system,  and  this  paper  makes  no  attempt  to  challenge  this  perception.
Principally,  because the state continues to matter,  not only legally but above all  mentally.
What this study does is to stress discrepancies regarding the latter, showing that biographical
narratives of the Swedish state convey at times evidently contending ideas about the state's
spatial and ideational allegiances. To scholars holding a fear for the dissolution of Sweden's
internationalist  role in foreign affairs, this paper may offer a sense of comfort.  The future
outcomes of this sudden political shift must nevertheless be carefully assessed, especially if
the current government accomplishes its top foreign policy goal and successfully acquires a
non-permanent seat on the UNSC. Whether or not an internationalist Swedish brand would
thrive at the heart of “our most important global actor“ is yet a question for future inquiry.
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